[Vol. 97:1673 endings that are not necessarily happy. Each book also can teach us about writing history. Each raises questions about the historian's method. What is more, read together, they put before us the deep est of questions regarding the construction of constitutional meaning.
What is most interesting about each work, however, is some thing so obvious that it may easily be overlooked. These books are about political abstractions embodied in constitutional institutions, structured by our predecessors' reduction of those institutions to a few words on paper and succeeding generations' tortured fealty to those abstractions in the face of immediate, real-life, substantive pressures. For lawyers, each book therefore raises, implicitly at least, questions such as whether fealty should be to the precise his torical meaning of each clause, whether the values embodied in cer tain constitutional language may become irrelevant to later polities, and, even more confusing to lawyers, whether such values may be said to migrate from one given constitutional clause to another. Each book thus raises, without answering, the question of what in such abstractions can command loyalty and passion.
THE STORIES3
The constitutional institution at the center of Professor Miller's story is the right to petition for redress of grievances.4 As Professor Miller rightly notes, " [t] oday the right of petition looks rather pale beside those robust rights that have distinct constituencies, sharp disagreements, and sensational cases -freedom of the press, cer tainly, and religious liberty, and freedom of speech, or the cluster of rights in the middle articles of the Bill of Rights that protect the accused."5 In another era, however, when Congress, indeed the federal government itself, was deliberately left to its own devices in the malarial swamp from which the District of Columbia arose, 6 the right to petition was thought, by some at least, to be a core constitu tional institution. It embodied a vision of fair and representative government, one in which all the people, individually and collec tively, could make governmental officials aware of their worries and 3. Because the episode discussed by Miller antedates the controversies Rabban discusses, and for analytic reasons I develop in the last half of this review, it makes sense to discuss Miller's book before Rabban's.
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition th e Government fo r a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNST difficulties, and could even propose solutions to their concerns. The people would do so in formal documents styled petitions, and, by taking up their grievances in such forms, the people could require the officials to take cognizance of those grievances. In an era when communication over time and distance was limited to documents and messengers, and when physical isolation was profound, the cen trality of such a device in a republican polity was palpable.7
Antebellum America, however, was no idyll of com monwealthmen, as the book's very title suggests. The bitterly divi sive question of slavery hung in the background of American politics, especially of American constitutional politics, from the mo ment of the Fo unding forward, belying at a deep level the existence of a universal commonality of interest sufficient to keep all citizens united. Mill er's story is the intersection of the constitutional insti tution which presupposed such a commonality and the institution of slavery. From the first federal Congress, antislavery petitions had been presented to the federal government. 8 At first they were cast in traditional petitionary form. They were measured, reasoned doc uments, formal prayers to legislators to take action where Congress could: to constrict the future reach of slavery, to eliminate it where Congress had the power, and to alter the Constitution to prohibit it entirely. Thus, as the country expanded westward, petitions vari ously sought to keep slavery from the territories, to condition those territories' statehood on its prohibition, and the like. For the Dis trict of Columbia itself, where the Congress functioned as landlord and town council, some prayers went so far as to request slavery's local prohibition.9 Gradually, as antislavery sentiment crystallized, as the arguments grew more precise, numerous, and pointed, so did the vehicle for their expression. Petitions grew less formal, their tone less civil. As prayers turned to demands, they became shorter. The less attention they were paid, the more numerous they became. 10 What had begun as a specific articulation by some Quakers and a vague disgust that existed at some level throughout the country became a political movement, rooted in religiously inspired moral ism (pp. 80-84), a movement not quite secular but not sectarian, and with an extraordinarily pronounced regional character. The aboli tion movement never succeeded in claiming all those who felt dis comfort with slavery. Its rhetoric was too radical, its adherents too [Vol. 97:1673 eccentric in too many ways for that.11 Nonetheless, abolitionists grew in number and formed the vanguard of antislavery sentiment more generally. One of their political eccentricities -or at least an eccentricity of a large minority of abolitionists -was a willingness to countenance, at first simply as signatories on petitions, and later to encourage, as active speakers and circulators of petitions, women and free blacks to participate in abolitionists' work (though this en couragement ultimately split the movement). Quakers had, in their petitions to the early Congresses, allowed women signatories, but later abolitionists, some Quakers included, went much farther.12 Chief among the tactics of abolitionists was a concerted attempt to keep antislavery at the forefront of American politics, and their chief vehicle was to petition Congress (pp. 107-12). The petition campaign was a conscious and sustained effort, suffused with moral ism, but a political campaign nonetheless. By the middle of the 1830s, slavery, which had bedeviled the workings of so many American institutions, thus collided with the constitutional institution of petition. A decade-long clash ensued in the Congress, more clearly and quietly in the Senate than in the House, but almost concurrently in both chambers. Southern sena tors, visibly irritated and insulted by the persistence of antislavery petitioning13 and at least vaguely fearing that the Senate's constant focus on slavery might actually result in tangible victories for anti slavery forces, 14 succeeded quickly and without much fanfare in having the Senate adopt a parliamentary device which automati cally responded negatively to antislavery petitions (p. 144).
Southern representatives, who were no less irritated, insulted and fearful than their senatorial counterparts, achieved a much more hard-won success. What Miller does before telling the story of what was labeled the "gag-rule," the rule of the House barring reception of antislavery petitions, is to give enough background briefly to set the stage. We are reminded, to be sure, of the evolu tion of antislavery sentiment and abolitionism,15 but Miller quickly moves to personalities rather than social forces and movements. Yo ung Southern representatives, perhaps egged on by the states men of the Senate,16 quickly rose to defend the honor of the South Miller gives us an almost day-to-day recitation of the events as they unfolded from the gag's adoption in 1836 until its repeal in 1844. Along the way he takes time for some excursions into related matters. He briefly discusses the role of women in the petition campaign,2° the struggles within the political parties, including those based on slavery,21 the nature of antebellum Protestantism,22 and other related topics. But, overwhelmingly, Miller's is a story of personality and conflict -Adams and allies, at first laid low, later triumphant (pp. 476-79). Adams, the hero, collapses in the House and dies within days, only a few years after the gag's repeal (pp. -125) , and others -all made claims that their expression was protected. Their faith, or at least the faith they articulated, like that of Adams before them, was an an abstrac tion rendered by writing into a constitutional institution: freedom of speech.25 And, like Adams, they had to wait, but not for a decade -rather, they had to wait for half a century or more before their faith was rewarded.
458-59
These cultural friends of free speech waited because the execu tive branch, the traditional organ suspicious of eccentric public ex pression, was abetted by a legislature with powerful conformist and seemingly maj oritarian political impulses,26 and by a judiciary that refused to read the Fi rst Amendment as anything but a supercodifi cation of common law doctrines limiting prior restraint (pp. 132-46). All branches of government did what they did at least in part because the speakers were culturally marginal, their speech all the more so. They articulated concerns not just eccentric, but eccentric in ways perceived as antithetical to what was proper in a good soci ety.27 The judiciary, in the traditional story, thus broke ranks when Holmes and Brandeis, influenced by Chafee, redefined the Fi rst Amendment to protect political speech, carving out an exception in the pattern of suppression (p. 1).
However laudable the creation of that toehold for free speech, Rabban tells us that it was based in error, probably willfu l error. Rabban's most interesting subtale is his reconstruction, and conse quent destruction, of Chafee's seminal articles in which Chafee at tributed to Holmes an interpretation of the Free Speech Clause that Holmes never intended. Rabban says Chafee willful l y read
Holmes's opinion in Schenck v. Un ited States28 as narrowing the doctrine of prior restraint with its "clear and present danger" lan guage when, in fact, no evidence for such a reading exists and much contradictory evidence abounds (pp. 322-26). Why, then, did 25. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of sp eech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev ances." U.S. CoNST We are allowed to infer, however, that Holmes was not beyond being influenced, and that the considered opinion of other learned members of the legal and political elite had its ef fect -not, perhaps, as pure persuasion, but as an indication that at least some of the speech at issue might be that of persons not quite so culturally marginal as generally supposed (pp. 346-49). Even if Holmes still viewed much of this speech as that of "an ass . . . drool[ing] about proletarian dictatorship" (p. 356), the fact that others of his ilk felt the drool worth defending may have led him to acknowledge that defense of speech, at least of political speech, had moved away from the periphery and somewhat closer to the core of respectability and acceptance. Indeed, that he even felt it incum bent to mention his defense of the right suggests that he was sensi tive to the attention being paid to free speech.
Thus, like Miller, Rabban finds two groups of heroes. Free speech plaintiffs and their lawyers, like antislavery petitioners before them, exercised their rights and did so from the very margins of society. Their defenders -Adams, Brandeis, Hand, and the condescending Holmes -by their defense lent legitimacy to a broader understanding of the utility of tolerance and the demo cratic value of speech. Nonetheless, Rabban, like Miller, has cast his story in traditional terms: interest groups whose interests are best exemplified by important personalities.
Why did the plaintiffs believe in the right in the first place? I doubt very much that every birth control advocate, every defender of organized labor, and every other speaker of the unacceptable shared Thomas Cooley's rejection of the Blackstonian notion that the Free Speech Clause merely set out the governing common law on prior restraint (pp. 177, 192). Holmes's curious metaphor, "the marketplace of ideas," also fails to capture the faith with which ad herents of bad, losing, eccentric, unpopular, and sometimes genu inely pernicious ideas pursued them then and pursue those ideas even today; nor is the marketplace metaphor particularly apt for those who genuinely believe in free communication, even when they regard the content as drivel, or worse. Indeed, is there any evidence other than the tautological for the notion that the measure of the worth of an idea is its acceptance? Something deeper in the culture was at work; something deeper motivated generations of cultural radicals to keep articulating free speech claims in the face of the hostility of the courts. In contrast with Miller, who leaves us to wonder about the motivations of the constitutional traditionalists who defended the right to petition, Rabban links the right of free speech to the belief of libertarian radicals in "the primary value of individual autonomy against the power of church and state" (p. 23). Rabban argues that desire for such autonomy was what led its pro ponents and defenders to go to such lengths on behalf of an abstrac tion. General autonomy rationales, however, tend to lose out when weighed against immediate and keenly felt threats to more concrete interests.
RECASTING THE STORIES
For the record, I am among those who hold to that faith in the value of free communication. Nonetheless, as with all faiths, the empirical support for the utility and virtue of free communication is thin, at best. (I hasten to add, however, that the empirical support for those who would limit speech in the name of the larger good has always struck me as equally, if not more, thin.) What might we gain, however, if we read both Miller and Rabban somewhat uncon ventionally, recasting their works sympathetically but doing so in ways consonant with the themes of their works? We need not read Miller as simply a story about antislavery forces clashing with Southern interests, the petitioners against the slavocracy. We might instead read it as one about an abstraction -the right to petition -pitted against concrete interests, those of slavery. Similarly, we need not read Rabban simply as a story about culturally marginal agitators battling a conformist maj ority personified in a hostile judi ciary. We may, rather, view it as a story about proponents of an abstraction -the right of free speech -pitted against the interests of a polity weakly committed to this abstraction but led by a gov erning group intensely interested in the preservation of an estab lished order. I do not mean to suggest that this is not already a component of the stories both authors tell, though it is a much greater part of Rabban's story than of Miller's. But even in [Vol. 97:1673 Rabban's work, the story of the autonomy rationale as the basis for a free speech faith sometimes sounds, as Rabban would be among the first to admit, a bit self-serving (pp. 381-93). We also know that all too often proponents of their own autonomy have precious little respect for autonomy claims of others.30
The theoretical implications for the First Amendment of won dering about the historical force of constitutional abstractions are clear. Every time the government seeks to suppress petitioners or speakers, it does so claiming that the greater good will be protected. Southerners trumpeted the gag-rule not just as a protection for Southern honor and interests,31 but as a protection of the Union and the interests of a united and strong America.32 Legal tradition alists claimed that the "bad tendency" test allowed for punishment of speech that led to social unrest, riot, division of the classes, and difficulties in the conduct of military policy.33 In every case the claims were, if not true, at least plausible and difficult to refute.
Arrayed against claims of specific dangers, specific harms, and palpable injury were the necessarily inchoate interests of freedom and rights, abstractions removed from the concerns of those af fected by their exercise. Modern political theorists of the public choice school have a powerful reason for suggesting that this read ing renders the subsequent course of events implausible. According to such theorists, abstract and inchoate interests tend to lose to spe cific interests because attachment to more general concerns tends to be weaker, thinner, and more diffuse than attachment to specific interests. Hence we should not expect, the argument goes, a gen eral public expression of belief in free speech, the right to petition, or any other equivalent claim, to be able to hold up against the concentrated and passionate claims of groups with specific ratio nales for limiting such freedoms, especially when they can point to immediate inj uries and can conjure others.
Nonetheless, we know that both the right to petition and the freedom of speech, not the slavocracy and repressive cultural inter ests who used the federal government as their tool, ultimately tri umphed. Why? Let us indulge a very simple public choice thought experiment grounded in these books. These works suggest at least two aspects of constitutional culture that deserve to be addressed from both historical and theoretical perspectives. Fi rst, it may be that our constitutional culture has created, and is itself a product of, a set of expectations about the conduct of government that is con tinually reinforced and strengthened by challenges to those expec tations. That is, the general interest in the exercise of constitutional rights gives way to momentary specific interests, but, over time, the general interest outlives the specific interest and wins out, stronger and more resilient for the exercise. In other words, our constitu tional culture may develop something like antib odies, to use an un fortunate analogy. Nonetheless, even that hypothesis does not really address the position advanced by the public choice theorists.
The general and diffuse claim should still be defeated by the spe cific claim and should have no reason to rise again, since every so cial and political moment gives rise to reasons to limit expression.
In the case of the gag-rule, a Southern minority with an intense attachment to slavery overcame a weak majoritarian attachment to the right to petition. The right to petition had, after all, lost its cen trality as a means of political participation, and the Southerners were careful to conjure dangers that might arise from petitioningsuch as dissolution of the Union -that could actually rouse maj oritarian fears. Furthermore, Southerners did their level best to separate the general institution of petitioning from its use by the most socially marginal petitioners, women and free blacks, whom they attacked with special virulence, ignoring -if they even knew it -petition's own history as the universal means of political par ticipation. The gag was defeated, however, not as a result of the rise of pro-petition sentiment within the voting public, but rather as a result of the rise of an amalgam of political sentiments, including antislavery and sectional identification, among voters. Nonetheless, with the defeat of the gag-rule, public identification with expressive rights turned the prior efforts to stifle petitions into something with which to tar proslavery politicians.
Thus, the general claim for free expression persists, eclipsed but not defeated. Because it continues to exist as a social icon, it stands in opposition to the more specific claim even while in eclipse. It continues to resist and eventually, when the specific claim fades away, apparently emerges stronger than at the outset. This, then, is the second proposition worth exploring: that general support for free expression is not itself actually challenged. Representatives were dismissive, it counted against them (p. 106�.
Rabban's evidence is somewhat different. He shows that a wide variety of individuals and groups continually advanced free speech claims, claims they -or at least their lawyers -must have known were extreme long-shots at best, last-ditch desperation arguments at worst, given established doctrine and opinion. Nonetheless, the arguments were made. What is more remarkable, however, is the response that the arguments made by the believers in free speech and petition engendered.
At first glance Rabban's work seems at odds with the premise of the thought experiment. The cultural dissidents were the minority, after all, and they captured nothing, certainly not the institutions of government. But the premise of the thought experiment is the gen eral but relatively weak public attachment to the right of free speech. The interest group that captured the government therefore would be an elite defending an established order out of fear that the cultural dissidents might gain majoritarian sympathy and alter that order. (Certainly not all of the dissidents fit the pattern, but even if birth control advocates, for example, were unlikely to capture majoritarian support, those in control of the government linked them to causes with such potential if in no other way than through parallel forms of suppression.) The elite defending the order was itself, after all, a form of minority interest group. The emergence of free speech as a protected right came about not when the general public demanded it, but rather when members of the elite them selves saw instrumental value in certain dissident expression, and then only for speech that embodied that instrumental value.
Opponents of antislavery petitions and of the expression of cul tural and political dissidents were generally, though not universally, careful to portray themselves as not opposed to the exercise of the right to petition or the exercise of free speech either generally or in the abstract. Usually, in fact, their tactics often explicitly amounted to characterizing the exercise of either right as an abuse of the right or as something other than its exercise in the first place. Such at tempts to isolate and distinguish the contested exercise from the abstraction thus allowed them to proclaim their continued support of the abstraction (p. 13).
These proclamations, even if they were -as they must have been in at least a few cases -nothing but lip service to the consti tutional abstractions, were at least uttered. And they must have been uttered for a reason. Those proclaiming such fealty believed, they must have believed, that they would pay a political price for actually articulating opposition to free petition or speech. Further more, they must have felt that such a price was too high to bear in their support of more specific claims, even if the price was not very high as an absolute matter. It was a relatively cheap political align ment to support the abstraction, relatively costly to oppose it.
No matter how thin the actual support for the abstract rights, however, the salient point is that individuals who opposed particu lar exercises of the right to petition or of free speech felt that they had something to gain by noting their support for the rights in the abstract. Of course, the corollary is that an appreciative public stood ready to hear such support (p. 13), indeed may have required it in order to entertain the claim that an exception should be made to the more general right or to listen to a claim that a particular act was not covered by the protection of such rights. Crudely put, no one has ever won an election in this country by running against freedom, at least in the abstract. In other countries, however, (and the twentieth century is littered with examples) politicians pay no price or may even curry electoral success with such opposition. 35 Such speculation may demonstrate the persistence of a public constitutional culture resting on a belief in a set of abstractions, such as rights to petition and free speech. It does not, however, deal with the larger issue of how the specific interests challenging the particular expressions of the abstract rights evaporate. That is the other side of the public choice explanation -since the general belief, if it is only weakly held, cannot actually defeat the specific claim, the latter must itself lose support if the general belief is to come out on top. The explanation is, at least in part -as exempli fied in these two works -that interest groups come and interest groups go. That is, minority interest groups that must capture the political structure to achieve their goals must strike deals with other minority interest groups, a la Madison in Fe deralist No. 10. When such alliances collapse, the interests of any particular minority are vulnerable, even to a rather weakly supported maj oritarian posi tion. Alternatively, the minority interest group must either disap pear or become so marginal that it is unable to enforce its single minded will on a majority with a set of diffuse and therefore weaker concerns. In either case, the story of collapse or decline is contextu ally specific. The decline of a proslavery group in Congress able to enforce its will on the rest is both a story of lost allies and marginal ization. By 1844 the proslavery representatives had lost key allies in the House for a wide variety of political and other reasons (pp. 477-79). They were thus unable to muster the majority necessary to maintain the repressive gag-rule. The decline of strength in the House is, however, merely description and not explanation. It only describes membership in the House and does not itself explain the It was an issue in some of the campaigns for the House. While not central, perhaps, it played a role in demonizing proslavery senti ment and mobilizing a political center wary of the extreme claims made by the firebrand Southerners (p. 484).
The triumph of cultural proponents of free speech is at least as thickly contextual and more elongated than the decline of support for the gag-rule. The movements for sexual freedom, birth control, organized labor, pacifism, socialism, anarchism, and many others that Rabban notes as intimately connected to the history of free speech have been the subj ect of almost countless books and articles themselves. Nothing would be gained (and much lost) to sketch out here the history of any of these movements in this country, except to note the obvious: each has a rich and complex history, one in which success or failure cannot be measured by electoral margins in the House (or in any political body or bodies) but which must be measured by acceptance, often co-optation, of ideas. By most measures, therefore, all but socialism and pacifism have been suc cessful, and even socialism and pacifism have achieved victories, both political and programm atic.36
None of this is to say, however, that the successes of such move ments were exp edited by the crude attempts at repression charac teristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What may be true, however, is that such repressive efforts created a pe riphery of expression the suppression of which opened up a core of speech, political speech, that could -by the very creation of pe riphery and core -more easily be defended under the Fr ee Speech Clause. Rabban's graceful explanation of the role of progressive political and social theorists is crucial in understanding the creation of that core and worth quoting at some length. their conception of free speech. While often recognizing the social value of criticism, progressives ignored and occasionally condemned dissent that did not contribute to the community.
The dual commitment of progressives to critical inquiry and com munity harmony created a tension at the core of their attitudes about free speech ....
Progressive intellectuals frequently invoked the value of critical inquiry in science as a model for democratic life ....
The tension between critical inquiry and community harmony, evi dent even in the limited realm of scientific theory, became exacer bated as progressives extended the model of science to social issues and had enormous implications for the role of free speech in a democ racy. [pp. 212-14] On Rabban's understanding, therefore, before World War I com munity harmony, structured along the ideals propounded by the progressives, dominated their own interest in critical inquiry. World War I was a catalyst in transforming the views of the progres sives. The Espionage Act, and prosecutions commenced under its authority, moved the progressive center from complacency about critical inquiry to concern. As Rabban put it, Many progressive publicists, who had eagerly joined the Wilson ad ministration and supported the war effort, became increasingly con cerned about the repression of speech during and especially after the war .... The progressive intellectual capacity first to create the tension be tween inquiry and community, and then to shift the balance from community to inquiry while retaining the dichotomy, effectively created a core of speech to be protected and a periphery that could be legitimately compromised. The progressives could thus simulta neously engage in a doctrinal revision, co-opt a libertarian streak in free speech rhetoric, and legitimate that position by leaving an "other," the repression of which they, along with a conformist ma jority, approved.
The progressive volte fa ce highlights the final theoretical ques tion raised by these books. For constitutional lawyers the question raises issues which may be extremely problematic. For constitu tional historians used to exploring the changing meaning of text through the vehicle of court cases, it may be unsettlingly revisionist. For cultural and intellectual historians, however, it may be old hat. Political speech may have actually been at the very core of First Amendment values all along. Indeed, Rabban makes such a claim (p. 13). The Founders, drawing on their experience and the vicari ous experience of colonial and English history as they learned it, may very well have understood that political expression is founda tional in any political culture dependent on participation by those outside an oligarchy. They no doubt believed that a certain breadth of political participation was necessary legitimately to ground their claims that this country's political institutions rested in popular sov ereignty. They certainly claimed that they valued public commen tary on the actions of the government. How, then, could political speech not be at the core of the Fi rst Amendment?
Rabban's reference to the progressives' idyllic vision of critical inquiry is telling. Not for them the hurly burly of an open and schismatic politics. Rather, criticism was originally to serve com munitarian political ends. But, of course, the ordered and struc tured politics of community was not just a progressive vision. It was also a vision of the Founders. The vehicle for pure political speech at the Founding, at least the one which had a historical pedigree, was not the Speech or the Press Clause, but rather the Petition Clause, the clause at the center of Miller's work. Fr ee speech as a distinct legal right, by contrast, was in its infancy. For most of Eng lish and much of colonial history, the right to petition protected and ensured the broadest popular access to the organs and officers of government,37 so long as the communication was formally stated3B and politely, that is, deferentially, phrased.39 In this way political complaints served to reinforce rather than divide the political com munity. One of the stories -largely untold -of the late eight eenth and the early nineteenth centuries is the erosion of the petition as the primary vehicle for political expression and political expression's subsequent democratic reincarnation in the Speech and Press Cl auses.
This migration of protection for political speech from petition to speech and press is but one form of the disruptive migration of meaning within constitutional culture that historians are now un- covering. In another sphere -for example, the separation of pow ers -one thinks of the innovative work of Christine Desan on eighteenth-century legislative adjudication.40 Such migrations dis rupt a lawyer's search for continuity in constitutional meaning and remind historians who trace back the history of portions of texts that they should be keenly aware of anachronism. Read together, Miller and Rabban have provided the legal and historical communi ties with wonderful new lenses through which to understand the nineteenth-century disruption and transformation of the constitu tional culture and meaning of free expression.
Perhaps most important of all, the works remind us that there was a constitutional history in the nineteenth century, but to un cover it we must often look in unfamiliar places, not contenting our selves with received wisdom and twentieth-century categories of doctrine and structure. One implicit component of the received wisdom is that the nineteenth century was a century of relative peace as far as constitutional rights litigation is concemed41 and that the forays of federal courts into the arena, notably in Dred Scott v. Sandfo rd42 and Lochner v. Ne w Yo rk43 (which is regarded as a nineteenth-century case in spite of its year of decision), suggest that the quietude may have been a good thing. Perhaps the conven tional view is correct in that we did have to wait for Holmes and Brandeis, even for the Warren Court, before we could have the constitutional culture of which we are generally so proud today. Rabban and Miller, however, offer us a counterthesis, if we just know where to look.
Where might we look? Rabban and Miller implicitly offer use ful suggestions. Miller's work suggests that we should look to other institutions of government, especially the Congress, to understand how fundamental rights were viewed.44 Moreover, it also suggests that we look not just to other institutions, but other clauses of the Constitution as well. One example comes immediately to mind from the same era Miller explores. In addition to the petition cam paign, abolitionists attempted to send pamphlets throughout the country, and especially into the South. The Post Office -really, postmasters -intercepted many of the pamphlets and refused to deliver them.45 This, of course, amounted to censorship. So far as I what they write may,. perhaps ought to, affect our current constitu tional culture. In so doing they raise historiographical questions of the first order.
Rabban, in fact, deliberately raises many questions of interpre tation of the history of ideas in the opening of his work (pp. 9-12, 17-19, 21), though his is otherwise a very conventional monograph. It is, therefore, a very important book for the story it tells and for what he has uncovered, not so much for the methodology he em ploys. He is correct, however, that many theoretical options pres ent themselves, quite temptingly in some cases, to a modem historian. Indeed, something of a generational divide exists in the historical community. One need only sit in on a colloquium dedi cated to the study of history to hear the different voices. Graduate students and newly minted Ph.Ds. speak, among other things, the language of literary criticism and are eager to apply it to historical sources. Whether that application will , in and of itself, expose lay ers of meaning that have gone unseen by older generations of schol
ars is an open question. I understand that Rabban intends to explore that very topic in future work on intellectual historiogra phy. He notes that "[m]any scholars warn that an idea can have such radically different meanings for different people that any at tempt to analyze it as a coherent subj ect is doomed to failure" (p. 9). Rabban apparently rej ects such a conclusion -after all, the book continues for nearly four hundred more pages in an attempt to give coherent meaning to an episode of constitutional historywhile accepting the clear reality of contingent meanings and multi ple interpretations. I believe he is correct in his operating assump tions. Few, if any, interpretations are definitive, but many are more persuasive and enlightening than others. The more successful the interpretation, in my experience at least, the more one can count on the author having asked fundamental questions and having revis ited original materials or visited materials previously unknown. That all knowledge is partial hardly defeats the claim that one inter pretation is more useful -or, to be vulgar, simply better-than another.
Miller presents an altogether different historiographical con cern. He explicitly raises no questions of historical method or inter pretation. Like Rabban, however, he has visited original materials and told us an imp ortant story. Unlike Rabban, however, Miller seeks a popular and not an academic audience. (By further con trast, much of what Rabban has written was published during the 1980s and 1990s in law review articles (p. x n.4).) Moreover, Miller's work is dotted with explicit references to moral and polit ical difficulties that have confronted the United States in the past few decades, notably the civil rights movement51 and the Vietnam War,52 and he makes explicit his analogies in both the political and moral contexts.53 He overtly seeks a certain kind of meaninginspiration and moral reflection -by historical analogy.54 Histori cal analogy, however, is problematic both as a matter of interpreta tion, as Fischer has noted,55 and as a guide to thinking about present-day concerns, as Ernest May has demonstrated. 56 Nonetheless, in seeking to identify both heroes and villains and to draw lessons from their conduct, Miller revives the oldest of American historical traditions. Before history became the province of academics and history departments came under the sway of Ger man-trained historians (who viewed historical study as a science), American history was a literary endeavor, and the stories were con trived to inspire and to teach, above all to teach moral lessons, usu ally ones applicable to the polity as a whole. One eventual consequence of the introduction of Germanic scientism was the de cline of history as literature. The rise of scientism also led to spe cialization, and with specialization came studies that separated the American polity into classes, factions, and interest groups. Histori ans who claimed that America was, as a polity, committed to an overarching political ideal, or even a group of political ideas, over time came in for enormous criticism and even contempt. With the demise of the "consensus school" of history in the 1960s and 1970s, the serious attempt to generalize about nationally unifying political themes was virtually abandoned. s1
What is striking about both works is their quiet revival of the notion of a polity committed to a political ideal.58 Unlike, say, the American liberal tradition in the grand and subtly tragic vision of Louis Hartz,59 Rabban and Miller do not envision an ideologically cramped polity, cosseted by history. Rather, each sees a polity committed to a particular manifestation of a political ideal at some general level. This ideal is roundly compromised in fact but, despite the compromise, returns to live another day. This ideal is, in both cases, one of expression and its capacity to structure the nation's social culture and political life.
One of the grand themes of the old morally didactic style of history as literature was the strength and uniqueness of liberty in America. America was morally superior to Europe's corrupt and decadent societies, and the histories celebrated that difference. By the late 1960s and certainly by the 1970s such celebratory views were thoroughly in disrepute, and historians emphasized conflict and social history. The historians emphasized social context even in political and intellectual history, and within social context the myr iad groups that formed America jockeying for position in society. Gone from the story along with triumphalism were ideals or polit ical themes that knit the country together. Moreover, historians had begun to give us subtler accounts of American debts, political and otherwise, to England and continental Europe. In these stories the theme of freedom and liberty was sometimes slighted or forgot ten, sometimes told from its darker side, or displaced by the tale of the rise of liberalism from its ideological forebears, such as republicanism.
Rabban and Miller, however, refo cus our attention on the theme of liberty and freedom but without the self-congratulatory tone of earlier writers. Instead they tell us about conflicts within the larger theme, the struggle and compromises, the political and intellectual tactics, and, to some degree at least, the social context of freedom and liberty. In doing so they have begun a difficult task, one that differs from the tasks undertaken by previous historians. Whereas the triumphal style took freedom and liberty as both given and good, and whereas a more modem school took a degree of freedom for granted and either slighted its impact or told tales of its dark side, Rabban and Miller have undertaken to explain why and how people involved in the conflicts so dear to modem historians valued such freedom and liberty, and to describ e the efforts made on behalf of an abstraction and the compromises made in its name. They put flesh, not simply words, to belief systems of individuals, groups, and, ultimately, American society as a whole. These are, then, works which should assist historians, not just in their particu lar contributions, but for the larger theme of which the works are emblematic. Both authors have given life to the history of constitu tional institutions, and we are enormously in their debt for their efforts.
OMISSIONS
One of the stocks-in-trade of book reviewers is to say that it is not their job to criticize one author for writing the book the re viewer wished the author had written, and then to make such criti-(Vol. 97:1673 cisms anyway. I will not bother to deny that I am about to engage in such a paralepsis.
Miller, having drawn our attention to what he rightly notes is a neglected episode in American history and having thereby illumi nated the use of a nearly invisible constitutional institution, tells us far too little about the institution of the petition itself. He wants to tell a story about heroic opposition to slavery, and the gag-rule is his vehicle. While he thereby materially enriches public under standing of the right to petition as well as of antislavery, Miller would have profited by a richer historical explanation of the peti tioning the Quakers and other abolitionists undertook. The gag rule is not just an episode in antislavery, of course, but is also an episode in the history of petitioning.
I have already suggested that this inattention renders Adams's opposition to the gag-rule a historical curiosity. If Miller had better explained the institution itself, he would have situated Adams as simply the last of a school who regarded petition as the core form of political communication with governmental institutions and person nel. 60 The advent of sophisticated communication and transporta tion systems, the vehicles of centralized political parties, the explosion of printed media, and, above all, the growth of the franchise itself, had rendered petitions and petitioning less impor tant. 61 Adams was thus not quixotic, but old-fashioned.
Similarly, the petitioning by women and others was not really unprecedented, as Miller seems to suggest, in the nineteenth cen tury62 or even earlier. 63 The scale of their participation, however, was. Moreover, at least some of the women tapped into a long tra dition of participation by petition and were far from shy about their political sentiments in conducting the petition campaign. As Ly dia Maria Child noted, for example, "[t]he fact is, you cannot raise a solid anti-slavery structure upon an aristocratic ground-work. There is no moral cement by which the two things can be held to gether. "64 Such women were not, as Miller puts it, "a powerless and marginal handful of practitioners of a new sort of reform" (p. 65). Marginal they were, but powerless, no. The indication of the threat they posed was the venom with which they were attacked. Moreover, as moral and political agents, they acted with the consti tutional tool available to them, a tool of significant historical power.
Miller's story would thus have been materially and subtly en riched if he had described petition as a constitutional vehicle in eclipse. The petitioners would have been paid more attention in a different political culture. The petition campaign itself, the peti tions circulated, and the understanding of the political obligations of the House would all have been diff erent in a diff erent era. Such an era was within living memory, indeed was within the memory of John Quincy Adams. Failure to provide the details of petition's constitutional role weakens Miller's story. It does not detract from the heroism of Adams and Miller's other champions, but their stat ure, and that of the petitioners themselves, especially the women, would have been different had Miller incorporated a richer under standing of the institution they put in service of their beliefs , both antislavery and pro-petition.
Similarly, for all its breadth and profound revisionism, Rabban's story would have been richer had he been able to focus more of his attention on the debate about free speech within the executive branch and Congress, and among the cultural dissidents themselves. In places we are given such context, as in discussions within Con gress and the executive about the wisdom, constitutional and other wise, in adopting and using the Espionage Act (pp. 248-55). Elsewhere such discussions are curiously absent. All the more curi ous, since what emerges with crystalline clarity from Rabban's work is the judicial hostility to novel claims for free speech. The dissi dents to whom he refers, and certainly their lawyers, knew of the hostility. Where, then, did their claims come from? Some cultural tradition, some institutional embodiment of their claims -claims which were made after all, as if they were not novel -had to have informed such beliefs. Belief in personal autonomy is one thing. Belief that such autonomy is embodied in the Free Speech Clause, quite another. My complaint is, however, probably premature. Rabban promises to push his revisionism back further (p. 20), and I eagerly await that work.
I freely admit that these criticisms are minor ones. These are important books, especially when read together. However difficult constitutional lawyers and some historians find assimilating these works, all will benefit from the ways in which they expand our legal and historical imaginations. They suggest, at a minimum, that we should not, either as lawyers or historians, think that only courts and grand thinkers add to our understanding of constitutional meaning. They suggest that we should revisit the clauses of the Constitution which today are dormant, not simply to uncover their history and to give a richer picture of the constitutional whole, but to suggest ways in which, in an altered political culture and an alto gether different physical and social context, these dormant clauses may embody values we have engrafted onto other clauses today. Finally, of course, they counsel caution in accepting received wis dom wholesale. Constitutional meaning is, after all, a cultural prod uct, the contextual production of which merits our close attention.
